Although extreme right politics and radicalism in general had already been targeted by scientific research in Hungary in earlier decades by researchers such as sociologist Andras Kovacs and the psychologist Ferenc Erős, the subject has become one of the leading issues in Hungary since the national elections of 2010, when the radical right-wing party Jobbik (the name means both “more right”, “more to the right-wing,” and “better”) won over 12% of the parliamentary seats.

Two aspects make the present volume special among Hungarian research on this topic: it summarizes the outcomes of very recent survey data and it addresses the social-psychological structure of authoritarian attitudes very broadly. By analyzing the range of authoritarianism in society as widely as possible the authors avoid in their scientific undertaking expressing their own personal political views. The analysis includes many parallels between extreme right radicalism and certain radical left-wing views of environmentalism.

The surveys were carried out by the Center for Social Conflict Research of the Eötvös Lóránt University of Sciences, Budapest and by the Faculty of Sociology and Social Policy of the University of Debrecen in 2010 and 2011. Data researched in the book are based on three representative surveys that were undertaken, with 1000 interviewed subjects each from the entire population of Hungary and two smaller surveys of 100 interviewed each respectively, of radical-nationalists and environmentalists as distinct groups.

The intellectual underpinnings of the research in Új tekintélyelvűség relies first and foremost upon the description of the authoritarian personality that was developed by Theodor Adorno, a member of the Frankfurt School, and elaborated between the two World Wars in Germany and later in the US. Accepting Adorno’s definitions, the political science community formalized and defined this type of personality with the term TAP (The Authoritarian Personality). The authors rely further on theoretical frameworks such as the Wilson-Patterson Conservative Scale and Terror Management Theory.

The book consists of two main parts: a quantitative analysis which applies the rich theoretical literature of social analysis for interpreting answers the interviewed persons gave to survey questions, and a qualitative part which consists of a focus group analysis of the arguments expressed by the sample group members (the members o each of the two groups studied) regarding certain major topics like national identity, ethnicity, race, education, family and globalization.

The authors clarify at the beginning of their study that research of radicalism is often criticized for its possible bias against the right wing, and this may be why they tried to keep an intellectually honest parallel between the often racist and socially fascistic kind of radical-nationalist right-wing mentality, on the one hand, and the somewhat fundamentalist commitment of certain environmentalist views, on the other hand. It is, however, important to acknowledge that there is nearly no left-wing radicalism in current Hungary since environmentalism and green politics are still very modest in scope. Hence any analysis on authoritarianism in contemporary Hungary ends up addressing almost exclusively right-wing radicalism.
In the introductory chapter the authors discuss the fundamental assumptions of their research and the methodological background of their work. They hypothesized that the base cause of authoritarianism in Hungary is the lack of any obvious authority in Hungarian society, while the broader thesis of the volume is that, contrary to the findings of the Frankfurt School, the two pillars of authoritarianism are the family and the nation. The present research team concluded that, while in today’s Hungary both pillars are missing, authoritarianism has nevertheless survived. The reason is that on the one hand today’s Hungary is a modern, individualistic society, with high social mobility, a low ratio of regular church attendance, an increasing number of divorces and a decrease of natality. On the other hand, however, the demands for more or less equal incomes, as well as increasingly homogeneous public and private institutions ethnically and racially, homophobia, xenophobia and anti-Semitism are rather widespread. It is precisely this particular ambivalence of modern and pre-modern attitudes in the present Hungarian society that makes this volume a useful sociological work. The authors claim that whereas the old forms of authoritarianism (as identified by the Frankfurt School) had been dogmatic, the newer authoritarianism relies primarily on the promotion of rigid social, ethnic and racial hierarchies.

Subsequent chapters discuss how radicalization emerges when unsuccessful individual actors invest their hopes in the promise of some kind of success of a group they want to belong to and which strongly advocates its exclusive Hungarian character. The vague conception of the radical-nationalist right-wing under scrutiny is that they can defend the individual against the alienating, nationally rootless experience of the global world as well as against the internal “aliens” who are scapegoated as traitors of the nation - mainly Gypsies, Jews, the very poor and the liberal thinking co-nationals who accept the fact of a globalized world. The authors conclude that because the doctrines of the radical right of today’s Hungary are strongly sentimental and full of contradictions, the movement cannot be considered as a coherent intellectual movement but only as a collection of certain cognitive and sentimental elements of a historicized, romantic, paranoid, mystifying, naive nationalist traditionalism, inclined toward radical and even violent projects of social and political reform.

Some of the main conclusions and observations of the volume deserve special attention. Of particular interest is the methodological distinction the authors draw between four types of Hungarians in terms of the modes of their self-interpretation as deep Hungarian (mély magyar), imagined Hungarian (képzelt magyar), rigid Hungarian (merev magyar) and real Hungarian (reális magyar). These types embrace the overview of one’s self-identification as Hungarian from its very exclusive interpretation on the basis of supposed descent from “true” Hungarian roots (deep), to its racially and socially inclusive, and typically non-authoritarian interpretation (real). Imagined, in turn, refers to those who are strongly attached to the symbolism of the radical right, such as to the map of greater Hungary (including the lost two-third part of the Hungarian kingdom before 1920) and the Crown of Saint Stephen. Rigid Hungarians are those who feel themselves attached to Hungarian symbolism but are not predominantly exclusive in terms of who may count as Hungarian. Thus they are not typically racist or authoritarian.

Together with the rigid, the imagined are the strongest representatives of the extremely rich “national wear” of both (often not authentic) elements of traditional national costumes, including also certain distorted signs of the Fascist Arrow Cross movement of the forties. The authors clarify that the label deep Hungarian (mélymagyar) was invented by the writer László Németh in the thirties and served to distinguish those who claim to have
descended from the original Hungarians from the newcomers (jöttmagyar), primarily those of Jewish and German origin, but also referring, less importantly, to all other later immigrant groups, such as Armenians and Greeks. This typology fits into the above-mentioned finding that there is a strong presence of sentimentalism in the way in which radical Hungarian nationalists define themselves and the world that surrounds them.

The clearest similarity the authors depict between right-wing authoritarianism and environmentalist radicalism is the wide acceptance of social equality, understood however in a different, even opposite way: whereas for right-wing radicals equality is identified with the demand for less difference in terms of income between the members of society and with the willingness not to let certain (racial or other) groups to gain better social and economic positions. For environmentalists, equality is associated with a strong anti-hierarchical character and with the demand of equal chances for all in the Western European liberal-democratic sense and without any further requirement of ethnic, racial or religious identity. Whereas for right-wing radicals equality refers to the virtual group of the “truly” Hungarians (deep, rigid and imagined) who “qualify” for their group membership, environmentalists use the concept of equality in terms of equal rights for citizens and in terms of human rights. The environmentalist conception refers to the national community as the society of a modern state rather than as the community of an ethnic state. The authors highlight that in this respect that right-wing radicals are reasoning in terms of Gemeninschaft (the German term for traditionally understood community) rather than Gesellschaft (society).

The reader may obtain two fundamental lessons. First, the analysis implicitly reveals that radically right-wing elements of mentality (strict class hierarchy, nationalism and racism) which had been politically predominant during the Horthy-era (1920-1945) persist in more or less open forms in contemporary Hungarian society. For instance, the primacy of the trauma of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 which obliged Hungary to renounce two third of its territory (Greater Hungary) appears to be much more present today than the tragedy of the alliance with the Nazi Germany in the forties. Second, by investigating authoritarian thinking as such is an important contribution to the understanding of the deeper social-psychological roots of potentially all forms of radicalism in Hungarian society. It is enlightening, in this respect, to recall once again the finding according to which an almost communist egalitarianism (nationalization and regulation of salaries) can easily coexist in the mentality of radical right-wing people with an evident hierarchical way of thinking about social differences, including gender, race and religious denomination. The national-socialist sympathy of the forties, the state socialist dictatorship of the later decades and the authoritarian reaction to the existential and cultural frustrations experienced since 1989 seem to re-enforce each other in the mentality of a significant segment of the contemporary Hungarian population and push them toward the relatively easy acceptance of right-wing radicalism.