

## Ukraine and Hungary


### *The Key to Relations is Sub-(Trans)Carpathia*

*Géza Jeszenszky*

**Abstract:** With the loosening of central control, the fifteen "Socialist Soviet Republics" started to (re)assert themselves. After the failed coup in August 1991, following the Baltic states, Ukraine declared itself independent. Even before that Hungary started to build special relations with its largest neighbor, and on December 6, 1991, signed a treaty with Kiev "on good-neighborhood and cooperation." An integral part of the treaty was a Protocol on the protection of national minorities. That provided extensive political rights to the then about 200,000 strong Hungarian community of Sub-Carpathia, including education in Hungarian up to the age of 18. In the next decade, Hungary had most cordial relations with Ukraine. Due to the growth of Ukrainian national feeling, much strengthened by Russia's seizure of Crimea and territories in the eastern border area, in 2017 Ukraine passed a new Law on Education. The new law restricted teaching in the language of a national minority only until the age of 10, above that making the required language of instruction Ukrainian. Hungary has been severely critical of the change, and retaliated by blocking Ukraine's western integration into the European Union and NATO. The conflict contributed to Hungary's unfriendly policy towards Ukraine following Russia's aggression in February 2022. Ukraine later modified the law so that instruction could continue in the languages of the national minorities. Since that change, there have been signs of a thaw in bilateral relations.

**Keywords:** *Hungary's relations with Ukraine; Transcarpathia; Hungarian history*

**Biography:** Géza Jeszenszky is a Hungarian historian and politician. He has completed degrees in history, English, and library studies at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, where he also attained his Ph.D. Following his work as a schoolteacher and librarian, he became a university professor at today's Corvinus University of Budapest after 1976. His more recent publications include *Post-Communist Europe and Its National/Ethnic Problems* (Budapest, 2005, 2009) and *Kíséret a trianoni trauma orvoslására. Magyarország szomszédsági politikája a rendszerváltás éveiben* ['Attempting to Heal the Trauma of Trianon: Hungary's Political Relations With Its Regional Neighbors in the First Years of Democracy'], a personal account of Hungary's relations with its neighbors during the years of the regime change (Budapest, 2016). His work, *Lost Prestige: The Changing Image of Hungary in Britain, 1894-1918*, was published in Hungarian in 1986 and a second, slightly enlarged edition was brought out in 2020 by the same publisher, Osiris. A substantially enlarged version was published by Helena History Press (Reno, NV) in English in 2020. Following the nation's political transformation, he acted as Hungary's foreign minister (1990-94) and ambassador first to the United States (1998-2002), then to Norway and Iceland (2011-14). [jgeza1941@gmail.com](mailto:jgeza1941@gmail.com)



New articles in this journal are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.



This journal is published by the University Library System of the University of Pittsburgh as part of its D-Scribe Digital Publishing Program and is cosponsored by the University of Pittsburgh Press

In the Soviet Union, there was a "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic" (1922-1991), which had a government, a foreign ministry, and even its own UN representation but was not a sovereign state, did not have any real autonomy, and was certainly not allowed to pursue an independent foreign policy (Magocsi 2010). When, by the late 1980s, the Soviet Union's economy was bankrupt, and central power was weakened because the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991), abandoned political rule based on terror and fear, the population in all the Member States began to think that independence would make it easier to emerge from the crisis and raise living standards as independent states. Commencing in 1990, the individual Soviet republics, began to exercise their right to secession, which existed on paper and was enshrined in the Soviet constitution. This process followed the independence movement of the Baltic States and was led by Russia and Ukraine. After the failed coup in Moscow on August 19, 1991, the Soviet leadership no longer opposed the aspirations of its member states toward independence. On August 24, Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, declared the independence of the Soviet republic, which was approved by 92.3% of the population in a referendum held on December 1. Eight days later, on December 8, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus declared the dissolution of the Soviet Union and agreed to a loose union of the three states, to which the other successor states could join, on the model of the [formerly British] Commonwealth. On December 21, in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, all the former Soviet republics, except the Baltic States and Georgia, joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The new Ukrainian state included Subcarpathia, or the "Transcarpathian region" (*Zakarpatskaya oblast'* in Russian or *Zakarpattia oblast'* in Ukrainian) as seen from Kyiv, with a Hungarian population of 150,000, which for a thousand years, until 1919, had been part of the Kingdom of Hungary. This territory and its Hungarian minority are a critical element in Hungarian-Ukrainian relations. Before 1918, the northeastern Carpathians and the lowland plain below them were not a distinct geographical or political entity. Yet their history, geographical characteristics, and ethnic and social relations distinguished them from the surrounding areas. The mountains were inhabited by Eastern Slavs, known as Rusyns or Ruthenians, while the lowlands were mainly inhabited by Hungarians as well as large numbers of Germans and Jews, the latter fleeing the Russian pogroms.

At the end of World War I, as a correction to the earlier Hungarian minority policy, the Károlyi government adopted People's Law No. X of 1918 on the "Autonomy of Ruszka-Krajna" on December 23, 1918, based on the program of the Ruthenian Grand Assembly held in Budapest on December 10, 1918. Under the leadership of Oreszt Szabó, the autonomous administration of *Ruténföld*, the Ruthenian National Assembly, and the *Ministry of Ruska-Krainia* were established. The Paris Peace Conference, however, in the form of the 1920 Trianon Peace Treaty, attached 3.4 million Hungarians, without consulting the population and against its will, to neighboring countries such as Romania, Austria, and the newly established Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Subcarpathia, or Ruthenia, with a purely Hungarian-populated section of land in its southwestern part, was assigned to Czechoslovakia. The Czechs did not keep their promise of autonomy for the province they called Rusynsko, but their enlightened colonial policy benefited the people of the area economically.

With the breakup of Czechoslovakia, induced by Nazi Germany in mid-March 1939, Hungarian military action, easily overcoming minimal resistance and supported by the majority of the population, restored Hungarian sovereignty to the area now called *Kárpátalja*

(Subcarpathia), thus re-establishing a common Polish-Hungarian border. The Teleki government was sincere in its intention to establish autonomy for the Rusyn region (*Ruténföld*), but the outbreak of the World War II and the critical strategic position of the area prevented this. In the late autumn of 1944, the Soviet army occupied the territory and, by order of Stalin, annexed this region to the Soviet Union, together with the Hungarian-populated section. The Soviet authorities declared the separate Ruthenian/Rusyn language non-existent and designated the Slavic population as Ukrainian. Ukrainization was soon made a reality with large numbers of settlers from Ukraine. The Hungarian minority, representing one-third of the population of the area in 1944, was decimated by the Soviet authorities through mass deportations. It subsequently constituted the hardest-hit Hungarian community beyond the borders of Hungary since Soviet oppression was harsher than similar policies in the so-called people's democracies. Despite their solid historical consciousness, the reality of being cut off from their fellow Hungarians by an impenetrable border and living under a totalitarian dictatorship threatened them with the same fate as the other small Finno-Ugric peoples of the Soviet Union: assimilation and disappearance.<sup>1</sup>

One of the fundamental goals of the foreign policy of democratic Hungary, established after the free elections in the spring of 1990, was sincere and lasting reconciliation and close cooperation with its neighbors, where significant ethnic Hungarian minorities resided. These Hungarians had been the victims of a systematic policy of repression and forced assimilation, a silent (sometimes open) "ethnic cleansing." For the Antall government (1990-1993), knowing the fate of the League of Nations' minority protection provisions, it was clear that only the guarantee and observance of individual and collective minority rights could ensure the future of the Hungarian minorities, and that the optimal framework for this was cultural and, where possible and justified, territorial autonomy.

Today, the hopes that were widely shared at the time of the regime change — that the democratic system would guarantee the existence and rights of Hungarian minorities — may appear to have been an illusion. However, there were examples of this in Western Europe, first of all in the German-French reconciliation and their ensuing intimate relations. Further examples included the language rights of the Swedes in Finland and the Germans in Belgium, as well as the increasingly promising situation of the German-speaking population in South Tyrol. Unfortunately, however, the relations between the peoples of East-Central Europe after the regime change did not follow the Western pattern; the policy pursued toward the Hungarian minorities became the Achilles' heel of reconciliation.

The first leaders of independent Ukraine apparently understood the importance of good relations with its neighbors and that one of its basic requirements was the fair treatment of Polish, Romanian, and Hungarian national minorities. The pilot project was with Hungary. Hungary was not the most important of its neighbors; the Hungarian minority in Ukraine was relatively small, and the common border was short. In 1991, however, Hungary was a highly respected country on account of its role in the historic changes ending in the collapse of communism in Europe. Hungary was also seen as a model democracy, the first formerly communist-dominated country to pass the test of being admitted into the Council of Europe, and the front-runner in the transition to a market economy. It was also well known that Hungary

---

<sup>1</sup> The recent history of Transcarpathia is presented in an exemplary joint undertaking by Fedinec and Vehes (2010); Fedinec and Szereda (2009); also Fedinec (2014), and the latest collection of studies, Fedinec (2019). An authoritative history is Magocsi (2015). Cf. Kuzio (2005),.

placed great emphasis on the rights of national minorities because almost three million Hungarians lived in the countries bordering Hungary.

On the threshold of independence, Ukraine started talks with Hungary on safeguarding the rights of its Hungarians (see Jeszzenszky 2023, especially Chapter 5). The Hungarian response was very positive, and the new government invited the Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Anatoly Zlenko, to Budapest. On August 24, 1990, exactly one year before Ukraine's declaration of independence, an agreement was concluded by the two governments to facilitate border crossing, which had been severely restricted in Soviet times. The Ukrainian leadership found the Hungarian connection helpful in furthering their independence aspirations.<sup>2</sup> In September, the president of Hungary, Árpád Göncz, visited Ukraine and its two largest Hungarian-minority towns, Ungvár/Uzhhorod and Beregszász/Berehovo (Keskeny 2012, 82–5). Géza Entz, head of the Secretariat for Hungarians Beyond Borders, held talks in Kyiv, Lviv, and Uzhhorod between February 21 and 26, 1991, and was enthusiastically welcomed. He heard promises of extensive rights and cultural autonomy to be offered for all minorities.<sup>3</sup>

It was against this background that on May 31, 1991, during an official visit of Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to Budapest, the two foreign ministers signed the "Declaration on the Principles of Cooperation between the Republic of Hungary and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the Field of Ensuring the Rights of National Minorities" and the accompanying "Protocol." It contains the rights that all national minorities claim but have been far from realized in East-Central Europe. It includes, among other things, the protection of national identity (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious), the prohibition against artificially changing the national composition of the population (resettlement), and the guarantee of education in the mother tongue. This treaty contains very positive principles for the protection of minorities: it recognizes national minorities as a constituent factor of the state. It establishes individual and community rights of minorities uniquely in our region, essentially enshrining the principle of cultural and administrative self-government. It prohibits forced changes in nationality ratios, guarantees the right of persons belonging to national minorities to "use their national first names and surnames" (a change from the Soviet practice), the right to study in their mother tongue "at all levels of education," and "the preservation and protection of historical and cultural monuments." The principle of autonomy is also included in the treaty for the protection of minorities: the parties "encourage the creation of a status which guarantees [for persons belonging to national minorities] the right to participate effectively in public affairs, including in matters relating to the protection and development of their identity and the making and implementation of decisions affecting their place of residence." Finally, the two parties committed themselves to promoting "the codification of the rights of national minorities in international law." To implement and monitor this, the document provided for the establishment

---

<sup>2</sup> See Páldi (1996), 192; also Póti (2001). According to the authors, the intensive Hungarian outreach encouraged Polish, Czech, and Slovak politicians to follow suit. However, the latter warned the Ukrainians that Hungarian intentions were insincere and only served to strengthen their position vis-à-vis neighboring countries so that they could demand the same benefits from their neighbors.

<sup>3</sup> Report by Géza Entz, the Head of the Secretariat for Hungarians Beyond the Border, March 5, 1991. Among my papers.

of a joint committee "composed of representatives of the state institutions of the two Parties and their national minorities."<sup>4</sup>

For the Hungarian government headed by the renowned historian József Antall, an independent Ukraine was a desirable "good" neighbor, separating Czechoslovakia and Romania, two of the states of the former Little Entente (the anti-Hungarian alliance of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia from 1921 to 1938). Hungary felt that its conduct and policies could contribute to Ukraine's future foreign policy and a friendly attitude toward the Hungarian national minority. In addition, Ukraine had historically tense relations with its other three neighbors, Russia, Poland, and Romania, with whom it had old-standing territorial conflicts; that, too, stood for a special relationship with Hungary.

On August 8, 1991, I arrived in Kyiv as foreign minister on an official visit at the invitation of the Ukrainian government in recognition of an independent Ukrainian foreign policy. On August 10, I traveled to Lviv/Lwów/Lemberg, a city reminiscent of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and with strong traces of a Polish past, where I was received with great friendship by the leaders of the opposition party RUKH (Ukrainian National Movement) and with touching warmth by the small Hungarian community. From there I entered the Carpathian Basin through the Uzsok Pass, the scene of fierce battles and a monument to fallen soldiers (of both sides) in World War I. At the historical border of old Hungary, a delegation of the Visk Municipality of the Hungarian Cultural Association of Subcarpathia (headed by its president, Sándor Fodó) was waiting with a fish stew in a pot. Together we drove to Ungvár/Uzhhorod, where we were welcomed by the local leadership, which had changed from Russian to Ukrainian. Unfortunately, due to the (deliberately?) protracted negotiations, the many Hungarians who had gathered for the opening of the Hungarian consulate in the capital city of Subcarpathia had been left waiting for the event. They had been waiting for forty-seven years for the official presence of Hungary to return to Ungvár/Uzhhorod, so perhaps they forgave me for the delay. I knew how much hardship and suffering this community had endured since the autumn of 1944 and what it meant for them to sing the Hungarian National Anthem again in public under the Hungarian national flag.

In the following weeks, our bilateral treaty with Ukraine was finalized and awaiting signature. After the disappearance of the communist regimes, it was entirely justified that the hypocritical and purely verbal treaties of friendship and cooperation, prescribed for each country by the Soviet Union, should be invalidated. At the same time, the idea of filling the power and military vacuum in the center of Europe created by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact with a new system of inter-state treaties was also gaining ground in Western Europe. First, a reunified Germany concluded treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, in lieu of a peace treaty and border agreement, and then with other states, including Hungary. Germany included in the treaties with its two eastern neighbors the pledge that it held no territorial claims on them and would not have any in the future, thus relinquishing territory that had once belonged to Germany. Poland used the same approach and wording in its treaties with Ukraine, Russia, and finally Lithuania, concluded and ratified between 1991 and 1994. In Poland, the repeated recognition of the loss of territories that had belonged to Poland for centuries did not cause any internal political tensions. Yet, there are still nearly half a million Poles living in those countries. The Antall government

---

<sup>4</sup> For the wider context of the two documents, see Paládi (2021). For the text of the Declaration and the accompanying Protocol, see "Közös" (1991).

was also ready to enshrine in treaties the new Hungarian democracy's transformed system of relations with both the now-free former Warsaw Pact states and the older democracies of Western Europe. Since those treaties were expected to settle all contested issues between the contracting powers, guaranteeing the rights of the national minorities was naturally an essential element in them.

On December 6, 1991, in the Kremlin in Moscow, Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall signed a bilateral treaty with President Mikhail Gorbachev. Despite earlier Soviet reluctance, the agreement recognized Hungary's sovereign right to join any alliance. The document turned out to be the Soviet Union's last international treaty. Half an hour later, Antall signed the first international treaty of the Russian Federation with President Boris Yeltsin in another hall. On the return flight, the Hungarian government delegation stopped in Kyiv to sign the first international treaty of independent Ukraine with President Leonid Kravchuk in the same afternoon. The Hungarian-Ukrainian treaty aimed to establish the best possible relations with Hungary's newest and largest neighbor and thus to rule out the possibility of any kind of anti-Hungarian collaboration between Slovakia and Romania on a shared intolerant policy toward their Hungarian minorities. This treaty was also a crucial step from the point of view of minority policy: we wanted to improve the situation of the Subcarpathian Hungarians, who had lived under suppression and without any political rights under Soviet rule.

What does the document on "good neighborliness and cooperation" contain? First and foremost, it sets out a commitment to cooperation in foreign and security policy, economic and energy policy, environmental protection, scientific research, trans-border cooperation, and the protection of national minorities. Article 2(2) states that "the Parties respect each other's territorial integrity and declare that they do not and will not have territorial claims on each other."<sup>5</sup> Article 17 of the Treaty, in particular, promised much.

The Contracting Parties, in full conformity with the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and other relevant documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, express their conviction that friendly relations between their peoples as well as peace, justice, stability, and democracy require that the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities of national minorities be mutually protected and that all conditions be created to ensure this. The Parties shall take unilateral and joint steps to promote the implementation of the obligations in accordance with the "Declaration on the Principles of Cooperation between the Republic of Hungary and the Ukrainian SSR in the Field of Ensuring the Rights of National Minorities" signed on May 31, 1991 and the "Protocol" annexed thereto. The Parties shall also act individually and jointly in their international relations to implement international documents concerning national minorities.<sup>6</sup>

The treaty was hardly noticed outside of the two signatories. When my experienced colleagues, diplomats, and international lawyers agreed on the text of the treaty with their Ukrainian counterparts, no one expected that it would be a source of controversy in Budapest a

---

<sup>5</sup> Ukraine, which had no internationally recognized borders, insisted on adopting this German formula. In fact, Hungary had given up Subcarpathia in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and in the subsequent Treaty of Paris of March 1947.

<sup>6</sup> The text of the treaty is in *Magyar Törvénytar* [Hungarian Law Gazette], Act XLV of 1995. The translation is mine – G. J.

year and a half later. Still less did the signatories think that twenty-six years later, Ukraine would be in serious breach of the document of friendship. For all its neighbors, the newly independent state of Ukraine insisted on including the German formula renouncing territorial claims in its bilateral treaties. It would have been an unforgivable mistake if Hungary had missed the opportunity to build a relationship of trust with its largest neighbor, a nuclear power with a population of nearly fifty-five million at the time, ahead of Romania and Czechoslovakia. The conclusion of an inter-state treaty, including a territorial clause, was also essential for the practical implementation of the detailed convention on the protection of minorities signed by Ukraine and Hungary in the spring of 1991. As a result, the political situation of the Hungarian community in Subcarpathia improved considerably, including the opening of several new border crossings with Hungary, their kin-state.

The international public did not pay much attention to the treaty, let alone press for it. A requirement to settle all bilateral differences and old conflicts was expressed only in the Pact on Stability in Europe, signed in Paris on May 21, 1995. This led to Hungary's treaty with Slovakia (March 19, 1995) and Romania (September 16, 1996).

In parallel with the referendum on Ukrainian independence, two local referendums were also held on December 1, 1991: one on creating Subcarpathia as a special economic zone and the other on establishing an autonomous district around Beregszász/Berehovo with a mainly Hungarian population. Both were passed with an overwhelming majority. Sadly, these two manifestations of popular sentiment were never honored or realized.<sup>7</sup> I felt compelled to raise this issue with Anatoly Zlenko, my Ukrainian counterpart. On April 4, 1992, we held talks in Beregszász/Berehovo, Ukraine, and then over the border, in Nyíregyháza, Hungary. Zlenko asked for patience, referring to the twelve million Russians living in the eastern part of Ukraine and Crimea, where an autonomous Hungarian territory would be seen as a dangerous precedent, a precursor to possible secession. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian foreign minister, in principle, saw no obstacle to this Hungarian wish. President Kravchuk said that the administrative changes that had been voted for would be implemented soon.<sup>8</sup> As I told the then biweekly newspaper *Kárpátalja*, "I sincerely hope that the excellent Ukrainian-Hungarian relations will be reflected in the fact that this step will be taken. These developments would prove spectacularly the thesis that the minority can really be a link between the two countries and that the minority is a crucial part of this cooperation and even a beneficiary of it."<sup>9</sup>

The leader of the opposition RUKH party, Vyacheslav Chornovil, had previously put forward federalist ideas,<sup>10</sup> but in the end his party and the majority of the Kyiv Rada adopted the French centralization model.<sup>11</sup> However, concrete, visible steps were available. The obstacles hindering increasing bilateral traffic and trade had to be removed since the only way available for rail and freight traffic between the two countries was and still is over the overloaded and narrow bridge at Záhony to Chop and along a single railway line. The leaders of the Hungarian

---

<sup>7</sup> The sabotaging of the results of the referendums is told by Fedinec, Halász and Tóth (2016), 192-197.

<sup>8</sup> See the Hungarian dailies *Új Magyarország* [New Hungary] and *Magyar Hírlap* [Hungarian Daily], April 6, 1991.

<sup>9</sup> Jeszenszky, Géza. "Kravcsuk elnök úr is megígérte..." [President Kravchuk has promised...], Interviewed by Tamás Mankovits, *Kárpátalja* [Subcarpathia], April 21, 1992: 8.

<sup>10</sup> Minutes by István Íjgyártó, Chief Adviser at the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Border, June 22, 1992; Fedinec, Halász, and Tóth (2016): 178.

<sup>11</sup> Article 2 of the Constitution states: "Ukraine is a unitary state. The territory of Ukraine within its present border is indivisible and inviolable (Constitution 1996). <https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b>.

Cultural Association of Subcarpathia (KMKSZ), which had evolved from a cultural organization of Hungarians in Ukraine into a political party, urged returning to the preferential local border crossing system.<sup>12</sup> Ukraine set out to implement the clauses of the May 1991 Declaration in its laws. The Kyiv Parliament adopted and enacted the Law on National Minorities on June 25, 1992,<sup>13</sup> and the presidential envoy for Subcarpathia issued a decree on its territorial enforcement on December 7, 1992. Among other things, the decree stipulates that "where the majority of the population is composed of a national minority, state officials and local organizations are obliged to speak not only the official language of the state but also the language of the national minority at a level necessary for their official duties."<sup>14</sup> The decree also authorized the display of the Hungarian national colors alongside those of Ukraine in official institutions in the Hungarian-inhabited villages and the city of Beregszász/Berehovo.

In the first half of 1993, Ukrainian-Hungarian relations continued to develop dynamically. On February 26-27, President Kravchuk and Foreign Minister Zlenko paid an official visit to Budapest. New agreements were signed or prepared on the mutual transportation of goods, closer inter-bank relations, cooperation on border water and flood protection, industrial and agricultural relations, simplified border crossings for the residents of the bordering counties, and additional border crossing points. Zlenko and I agreed that our understanding of the national minority issue was of European importance and was also suitable for addressing Ukraine's internal problems. We talked about solutions such as the legally established use of the "local language" in non-Ukrainian majority areas, autonomous districts, and Ukraine's western orientation via Hungary towards Austria and Italy.

Ukraine ratified the treaty with Hungary on July 1, 1992, but a small wing of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, led by István Csurka, started a campaign against it, denouncing their own government for having "given up" the region of Ukraine that had been part of Hungary before 1920 and between 1939 and 1944, and expressing disapproval that no Hungarian autonomous region had been created. Prime Minister Antall, therefore, proposed a meeting with Ukrainian President Kravchuk. A joint declaration, issued after the meeting in Ungvár/Uzhhorod on April 30, 1993, called for closer cooperation between the two countries and urged support for each other's foreign policy aspirations. "The parties stressed that the development of local democratic self-government in their countries is guaranteed by law. The Hungarian side welcomed the significant steps taken in Ukraine to implement the nationality law guaranteeing all personal freedoms and the right to national-cultural autonomy of the Hungarian population in Subcarpathia." ("Közös közlemény" 1993: 202-4) Thus, the declaration included support for an autonomous region.

The parliamentary debate on the ratification of the treaty with a neighbor of nearly fifty-five million people that also had nuclear weapons was passionate. I reiterated that since Hungary recognized the borders drawn by the peace treaties signed after the two world wars, I saw no obstacle in expressing that fact in bilateral treaties, provided that those treaties also contained due provisions for the protection of the rights of the Hungarian minorities.<sup>15</sup> In his concluding

---

F. Egry, Gábor. "Beregszászi tudósításunk" [Our report from Berehovo], *Népszabadság* [The People's Freedom] April 6, 1992, 3.

<sup>13</sup> On the law, its implementation, and further changes, see Fedinec, Halász and Tóth (2016: 160-179).

<sup>14</sup> The text of the decree is in Kraljo (1993: 43).

<sup>15</sup> Géza Jeszenszky responding to the intervention in the debate in the National Assembly, May 11, 1993. <http://www.parlament.hu/naplo34/295/2950148.html>.



remarks, Prime Minister Antall emphasized that Ukraine had no internationally recognized borders and that Hungary was eager to support the new state, its largest neighbor. "I assume full responsibility for all the consequences of this treaty, and I maintain that I have signed this treaty in order to strengthen Hungary's foreign political position and in the interests of the Hungarians living beyond the border."<sup>16</sup> The MPs of the governing coalition were not swayed by demagoguery, and they provided enough votes to ratify the treaty in its original wording. It is to the credit of the opposition (the Free Democrats, the Socialists, and Fidesz, the Young Democrats) that they also voted for the treaty.<sup>17</sup>

By ensuring the rights of the Hungarian community in Ukraine through exemplary good relations between the two countries, the treaty offered an encouraging alternative and a model for handling severe conflicts in the Balkans and the post-Soviet space. Hungary also signed treaties with Croatia, Slovenia, and Russia, all of which contained strong provisions for minority rights, in contrast with Slovakia and Romania, who were unwilling to follow their example. However, Romanian and Slovak extremists, who kept accusing Hungary of having intentions to resurrect Greater Hungary, found allies in the Hungarian Parliament in the form of MPs who opposed ratification and rejected the territorial clause.<sup>18</sup>

Instead of the expected boom, independence in Ukraine led to massive inflation and economic decline, with the population's savings wiped out. The decline was not offset by political pluralism and, in the case of the Hungarians, cultural and language rights. After the changes of government in both countries in 1994 and the departure of the Kravchuk-Zlenko duo that same year, cooperation slowed. While Hungarian-language education was strengthened, thanks to financial support from Hungary, and the *II. Rákóczi Ferenc Kárpátaljai Magyar Főiskola* (a Hungarian-language teachers' training college named after Prince Ferenc Rákóczi II) was established, the Hungarian-majority administrative unit was not set up.

Since the early 2000s, Ukrainian national feeling and identity have been on the rise. The increased use of the Ukrainian language, at the expense of Russian, is an element of that. (In the southeastern provinces, in today's war zone, more than ten million people were Russian speakers.) However, any attempt at restricting Hungarian-language education is contrary to the spirit and letter of the bilateral treaty. Then came the Ukrainian Minister of Education's Decree No 461 of 2008 on improving the teaching of the Ukrainian language. It threatened the very existence of the schools of the Hungarians in Subcarpathia. I raised the issue in my letter of June 27, 2008, sent to the then Foreign Minister Volodymyr Ogrizko, whose guest I was in December of the previous year, on the 90th anniversary of the birth of an independent Ukrainian foreign policy. Among other things, I referred to paragraph 10 of the May 1991 Declaration ("The Parties agree to provide the necessary opportunities for national minorities to learn their mother tongue and to study in their mother tongue at all levels of education").<sup>19</sup> I pointed out that:

---

<sup>16</sup> József Antall's closing words in the debate in the National Assembly, May 11, 1993, <http://www.parlament.hu/naplo34/295/2950150.html>. See also: cf. Antall (1994: 334–9).

<sup>17</sup> For the debate on ratification, see Jeszszky (2023: 274–282).

<sup>18</sup> For a surviving symptom of this irresponsible attitude, see Dányi (2017).

<sup>19</sup> It emerged only recently that the Ukrainian text of the Declaration differed from the Hungarian: "to learn their mother tongue *or* to study in their mother tongue..." A striking difference! Unless the two sides can agree on the text the issue should be taken to the courts.

The Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities (in particular Articles 12-14) and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which Ukraine signed in 1995 and 1996, respectively, and ratified in 1998 and 1999, also emphasize the right of national minorities to learn *in* their mother tongue. In addition to these legal obligations, the traditionally good relations between our countries and the understanding between the members of the two nations in the areas of Ukraine inhabited mainly by Hungarians also imply that there should be no change in a practice that has been in place for decades. The Hungarian citizens of Ukraine should continue to feel at home in the land of their birth, for which one of the fundamental conditions is the survival of the education system in their mother tongue, which ensures the preservation of national consciousness.

The reply sought to reassure me that improving the teaching of the Ukrainian language would not be at the expense of education in Hungarian.<sup>20</sup> The decree was indeed dropped.

The Maidan revolution of 2013-14, which ousted the pro-Russian president, Victor Yanukovich, and the desire of the majority of the people of Ukraine to see the country return to the path of democracy and European integration were hopeful developments. The solution to the problem of the different traditions and languages of the Russian and other non-Ukrainian communities could have been found in some form of federalism. However, rising Ukrainian nationalism in the Kyiv legislature led in the opposite direction: a centralized state and a program of "Ukrainization." This trend was reinforced by Russia's annexation of Crimea, in grave violation of international law, and the Russian intervention in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The national minorities have been adversely affected by the war. In 2016, the issue of schools having Hungarian as the language of instruction and university entrance exams being held only in Ukrainian was back on the agenda. At an international conference on Ukraine held in Budapest in November 2016, I warned with cautious optimism that:

such a change would be a serious breach of the treaty and of the intimate relationship between the two countries, and it is hoped that it will be taken off the agenda for good. It has not yet been decided whether, in the current war situation, Ukraine will go down the path of anti-minority nationalism, provoking protests from many of its neighbors, or whether, by adopting Western and European principles and practices, it will ensure for its Hungarian citizens what it has committed itself to in the 1991 treaty with Hungary. The treaty is valid, and in the event of a breach, we can appeal to the international courts in The Hague and Strasbourg and to international forums. However, I hope that such an appeal will not be necessary and that Ukraine will remain a good neighbor and friend of Hungary. At the same time, it is time for the 25-year-old Ukrainian promise, confirmed in the referendum, to be fulfilled, namely, that Berehovo and its Hungarian-majority district become a separate administrative unit and constituency. The basis for this was laid down in the 1991 treaty. The current transformation of Ukraine's administrative system is based on the principle of decentralization carried out under wartime conditions. If this is done based on the proposals of the local population and its organizations, then a quarter of a century after the will of the Hungarian community expressed in the referendum and the promises of the Hungarian-Ukrainian treaty, a Hungarian-majority district with Berehovo

---

<sup>20</sup> This correspondence is among my papers.

as its center could finally be established. This would also vindicate those who voted for the treaty in May 1993.<sup>21</sup>

Since the centralization model has come to prevail in Ukraine and nationalism has swept over the country in the wake of Russian aggression, the national minorities have also indirectly become victims of the invasion. When I passed through Beregszász/Berehovo in early 2017, I was struck by the disappearance of the Hungarian language from almost all public places since my last visit years ago. In a shopping center, the vast majority of vendors and shoppers were, I was told, Hungarian. However, all written and verbal communication was in Ukrainian. (In Slovakia and Romania, countries that are rightly criticized for their language laws, I did not see anything similar in the Hungarian-populated parts of the country.) The aim of centralization is not only to suppress the use of the Hungarian language but also to gradually weaken Hungarian identity and, over time, eliminate it, as is evidenced by the Education Law adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament on September 5, 2017. According to this law, schools teaching mainly in a minority language would have to switch to Ukrainian, and children belonging to a national minority, from the age of ten, would study all subjects only in the official language of the country. (Law on Education 2017: 10-11)<sup>22</sup> This provision, which is contrary to current practice and to all European models and conventions, has provoked strong protests in the countries neighboring Ukraine, all of which have ethnic minorities in Ukraine. I have criticized the law in numerous forums and writings (Jeszszky 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d).

The Ukrainian intention for national minorities to learn the Ukrainian language is understandable, but the 2017 Education Law aims to do more than that. It intends to gradually weaken and, over time, eliminate the identity of minorities, although it does not explicitly say so. Centuries of experience, confirmed by educational experts, demonstrate that the most effective way of learning is in the mother tongue. In Ukraine, too, primary and secondary education in the mother tongue ensures truly equal opportunity so that pupils leaving school can integrate successfully into society. The way to achieve this is by continuing to teach ten-to eighteen-year-old young people in their mother tongue. The only way for a national minority to learn the official language well is to learn it as a second language, taught by qualified teachers, and under proper financial conditions. Those who wish to pursue higher education in Ukraine will be able to continue their studies in Ukrainian, having acquired the appropriate language basics at the Hungarian schools and having passed the entrance examinations in their mother tongue, just as successfully as the hundreds of thousands of their fellow European students who, having completed secondary school in their mother tongue in their home country, are studying for a longer or shorter period at a university in another EU country. The claim that the new law is in the interests of the children and that it may enable a non-Ukrainian student one day to become president of Ukraine is a ridiculous piece of Ukrainian propaganda. If ten-year-old children in Ukraine who are not native speakers of Ukrainian were to be required to study mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology in Ukrainian, they would most probably achieve poor academic results. They would not even have a chance to continue further in their education.

---

<sup>21</sup> Ukrainian administrative reform and minority representation.

[http://bgazrt.hu/\\_files/NPKI/ELEMZ%C3%89SEK/ukran%20reform.pdf](http://bgazrt.hu/_files/NPKI/ELEMZ%C3%89SEK/ukran%20reform.pdf). Unfortunately it is no longer on the web-site.

<sup>22</sup> See online at: [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF\(2017\)047-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)047-e).

The aim of assimilating national minorities is not without precedent. In Central and Eastern Europe, such efforts date back to the birth of modern nationalism. At one point in their past, all states having a substantial number of citizens belonging to a national minority have tried to reduce their number and proportion through assimilation, expulsion, or outright murder, euphemistically called "ethnic cleansing." It has sometimes been suggested that the new Ukrainian law is directed "only" against the Russian language, with the other minorities falling under the category of "collateral damage." Even if that were the case, it would be unacceptable.

Prior to the Russian aggression, Hungary had shown sympathy and support for its Ukrainian neighbor in many ways. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the 2017 Education Law violates the 1991 treaty ratified by the legislatures of both countries and several international conventions signed by Ukraine, and is not in line even with the Constitution of Ukraine. According to Article 21 of the basic treaty with Hungary, "The Contracting Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty in the first instance by consultations, direct negotiations, fact-finding conciliation, and conciliation procedures." Failing this, "they shall have recourse to other agreed means of dispute settlement in accordance with international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe."

"There are people in the country who do not speak Ukrainian at all, and this is ultimately an issue of our unity and national security," Pavlo Klimkin, then foreign minister, reportedly said in 2017.<sup>23</sup> This sentence, this thinking, indicates that today's Ukraine has a highly nationalistic, even dangerous, concept of itself as a nation-state. A significant proportion of its population is not Ukrainian, either linguistically or in identity. Prior to the aggression by Russia, close to twenty percent of the population of Ukraine was Russian-speaking. If all children are compelled to attend Ukrainian schools, Russia has an excuse to continue more vigorously what it has begun and to try to annex more territories on the pretext of protecting the Russian minority.

The post-World War I peace treaties obliged all Central and Eastern European states to sign treaties on the protection of minorities. It stipulated, among other things, that the state was obliged to provide education for its national minorities in their mother tongue from the national budget. The Council of Europe's Framework Convention on Minorities, its Language Charter, and the recommendations of the OSCE make provision for education in one's mother tongue. It is also an important principle that states should not deprive national minorities of existing rights.

The Hungarian government, led by Viktor Orbán, has not only protested vehemently against Article 7 of the law but also announced that, unless it is withdrawn, Hungary will use all forums and means to block Ukraine's European integration. Ukraine stated on several occasions that it requests and would accept the Opinion of the Venice Commission,, the Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe, in the dispute with its neighbors over the school law. As expected, the internationally renowned legal experts were tactful in their twenty-five--page opinion that came out on December 8, 2017 ("Opinion" 2017).<sup>24</sup> All the parties could find something that pleased them but also cause for disappointment. The Commission approved the aims of the law: "It is a legitimate and commendable aim for states to promote the strengthening of the state language and its command by all citizens and to take action for its

---

<sup>23</sup> *Új Szó* ([New Word], Bratislava), September 27, 2017, title page.

<sup>24</sup> See the document online at: <http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD%282017%29030-e>.

learning by all as a way to address existing inequalities and to facilitate more effective integration of persons belonging to national minorities into society." ("Opinion" 2017: 24) On that basis, the Ukrainian Ministry of Education, the Ukrainian media, and its international outlets hailed the Opinion as a great victory for Ukraine and a defeat for Hungary.

The Venice Commission, however, also found that "criticism seems justified due to a number of reasons." First, referring to Article 7 of the Ukrainian language law, the Opinion stated that "the Article, as adopted, is quite different from the draft on which minorities were consulted." (Ibid.) According to paragraph 120 of the Opinion, Article 7 of the Law "actually allows to radically change the previous language regime, at least in secondary education, towards a system focused on the mandatory use of the Ukrainian language as the language of education. This could result in a substantial diminution in the opportunities available to persons belonging to national minorities to be taught in their languages, which would amount to a disproportionate interference with the existing rights of persons belonging to national minorities." (Ibid.) Paragraph 122 of the Opinion then continues: "If the law were implemented in a manner that minority languages could only be taught as a subject and there would no longer be the possibility to teach other subjects in the minority language, this could clearly be a disproportionate interference with the existing rights of minorities." The Commission, with a large dollop of wishful thinking, stated that in the implementation process the Ukrainian authorities could remedy the situation, pointing out that "the Law on General Secondary Education, still to be adopted, could provide for more detailed and balanced solutions." ("Opinion" 2017: 25) The Conclusions also made much of the legal loophole in the law, which raised the possibility of teaching some subjects in the official languages of the EU: "The results of the current bilateral talks with minorities' kin-states could provide useful input to the implementation of Article 7 in this respect." (Ibid.) Since this would not apply to Russian, the Commission tactfully commented: "The less favorable treatment of these languages [Russian and other non-EU languages] is difficult to justify and therefore raises issues of discrimination." (Ibid.)

The Commission's final verdict could have only one interpretation, namely, that Article 7 should be substantially modified: "The appropriate solution would certainly be to amend Article 7 and replace this provision with a more balanced and more clearly worded one." (Ibid.) The Opinion then went on in more detail, stating that

The Venice Commission recommends in particular: to fully use, when adopting implementing legislation, the possibilities provided by paragraph 4 of Article 7 to ensure a sufficient level of teaching in official languages of the European Union for the respective minorities; to continue ensuring a sufficient proportion of education in minority languages at the primary and secondary levels, in addition to the teaching of the state language; to improve the quality of teaching of the state language; to amend the relevant transitional provisions of the Education Law to provide more time for a gradual reform; to exempt private schools from the new language requirements in accordance with Article 13 of the Framework Convention; to enter, within the framework of the implementation of the new Education Law, into a new dialogue with representatives of national minorities and all interested parties on the language of education, to ensure that the implementation of the Law does not endanger the preservation of the minorities' cultural heritage and the continuity of minority language education in traditional schools." (Ibid.)

Strengthened by this opinion, Poland and Romania entered into talks with Ukraine regarding the law. Besides vague media accounts of their progress, no concrete results were reported until December 2023.

The dispute over the Education Law became more bitter after Russia's "special military operation" started on February 24, 2022. Although the Hungarian government, too, termed the act an aggression, it has continuously called for an immediate ceasefire and peace talks. Given that Russia is presently occupying close to twenty percent of Ukraine's legal territory and shows no signs of withdrawing and, if anything, is pressing on to capture more and has passed legislation on the annexation of a large part of Ukraine, a ceasefire would only stabilize Russia's current conquest. Hungary has charged that despite the reception of a large number of refugees from Ukraine (not only ethnic Hungarians) the Hungarian minority has also been the victim of hostile actions, such as the further removal of Hungarian symbols and the exceedingly high death toll among recruits from the Hungarian minority, although the latter cannot be verified.

The issue of education in Hungarian has not been the only cause of tensions between Hungary and Ukraine. The Orbán government has continued to maintain the most cordial relations with the aggressor; Foreign Minister Szijjártó makes regular visits to Moscow; and the pro-government media denounces the alleged "warlike temperature" of the European Union while advocating an immediate ceasefire, which is tantamount to capitulation by Ukraine. The impression in Kyiv is that Hungary is hoping for a Russian victory. According to critics of the Hungarian government, the fate of the Hungarians in Ukraine is simply a tool for turning the public in Hungary against Ukraine.

One of the preconditions for Ukraine's membership in the European Union is the provision of education for national minorities in their mother tongue. Faced with this, the latest amendment to the Education Law submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament, passed on December 8, 2023, and immediately signed by President Zelensky, apparently resolved the dispute. The amendment states, "in educational institutions, the language of the educational process is the state language. In classes (groups) in which the languages of instruction of national minorities that are among the official languages of the European Union are used, the right to use the language of the national minority in question is guaranteed in the educational process."<sup>25</sup> It does not therefore apply to Russian, in line with the aim of the legislation from 2014 and in particular since February 24, 2022, when Russia launched its war of aggression. On December 18, 2023, the Cultural Alliance of Hungarians in Subcarpathia (KMKSZ) welcomed the legal amendments passed by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on December 8 concerning the rights of the national minorities, but pointed out that there were still shortcomings in fully restoring the rights of the minorities that existed prior to 2017.<sup>26</sup> A meeting between the two foreign ministers on January

---

<sup>25</sup> "Zelensky Signs Amendments to Law on National Minorities." *Ukrainian Pravda*, 8 December 2023. Online: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/12/8/7432299/> Important details about the amendment are given Jędrisiak et al (2023) from the Polish Center for Eastern Studies (**Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich**) in Warsaw. See online at: <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-12-13/ukraine-another-amendment-to-law-national-minorities>.

<sup>26</sup> The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (New York) released the 18 December 2023 statement of the major Hungarian organization of Ukraine on 21 December 2023: (HHRF 2023) See online at: <https://hhrf.org/2023/12/21/kmksz-statement-on-the-amendment-of-ukrainian-laws-affecting-the-rights-of-national-minorities-communities-in-certain-areas-in-conjunction-with-council-of-europe-recommendations/>

29, 2024, broke some ice, but the long-awaited meeting between President Zelensky and Prime Minister Orbán has so far not been scheduled. (Finally, PM Orbán did visit Kyiv on July 2, However, the value of the gesture was lost by Orbán's visit to Moscow three days later.) At such a meeting, the issue of education in the Hungarian language might be resolved, and all the rights that the Hungarian minority enjoyed in the 1990s (as a result of the 1991 bilateral treaty) could be restored. This resolution would be an important step towards opening the long road towards Ukrainian membership in the European Union. Such a membership would also guarantee the future of the Hungarian minority of Subcarpathia – provided they still have a future. Sandor Fegyir, the Ukrainian ambassador-designate to Hungary, pointed out in an interview this April that in the last decades, the number of Hungarian children as well as teachers has declined considerably due to emigration to Hungary, and the process has gathered pace since the outbreak of the war.<sup>27</sup> Education in Hungarian in Subcarpathian schools requires Hungarian pupils.

Remembering the lack of political rights the Hungarians in Subcarpathia had to endure within the Soviet Union, the worst potential outcome would be a return to Russian domination. If Putin were to prevail in the present war, Ukraine would be reduced to a puppet state, to the present status of Belarus. That would be a tragedy not only for the Hungarians and other national minorities in Ukraine but for the whole world.

## Works Cited

“Constitution of Ukraine, Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 28 June 1996.” Online: <https://rm.coe.int/constitution-of-ukraine/168071f58b>.

“Közös közlemény a Magyar Köztársaság miniszterelnökének és az Ukrán Köztársaság elnökének munkatalálkozójáról” [Joint statement on the working meeting of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary and the President of the Republic of Ukraine], *Magyar Külpolitikai Évkönyv* [Hungarian Yearbook of Foreign Affairs], ed. Torda Endréné, Budapest: Külügyminisztérium, 1993, 202–204.

“Közös Nyilatkozat a Magyar Köztársaság és az Ukrán Szocialista Szovjet Köztársaság között a humanitárius együttműködés alapvető irányairól” [Joint Declaration between the Republic of Hungary and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on the Basic Directions of Humanitarian Cooperation], *Magyar Külpolitikai Évkönyv* [Hungarian Yearbook of Foreign Affairs], ed. Torda Endréné. Budapest: Külügyminisztérium, 1991, 212–22.

“Opinion on the Provisions of the Law on Education of 5 September 2017, which Concern the Use of the State Language and Minority and other Languages in Education Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 113th Plenary Session (8-9 December 2017).” Opinion No. 902 / 2017 at the Council of Europe / Venice Commission Website. Online: [CDL-AD\(2017\)0 \(coe.int\)](https://www.coe.int/t/e/CDL-AD(2017)0)

---

<sup>27</sup> Sándor Fegyir, “Hol jobb élni: Londonban vagy Palágykomorócon?” [Where Is Life Better: in London or in Palágykomoróc/Palagy Komarivci?], Interview by Roland Majláth. *Magyar Hang* [Hungarian Voice], 18 April 2024, p. 16.





—. "Ukraine's Blunder: A Nationalist Education Law Leads to International Uproar," *Hungarian Review* 9 (2018b), no. 1: 30–38;

—. "Ukraine's Conflict with Two of Its Neighbors," *Hungarian Review* 9 (2018c), no. 5: 42–49;

—. "Ukrajna nem enged az ukránosításból" [Ukraine Will Not Give up Ukrainization]. *Heti Válasz* 18 (2018a), no. 8: 27;

—. *Kísérlet a trianoni trauma orvoslására. Magyarország szomszédsági politikája a rendszerváltás éveiben* [Attempting to Cure the Trauma of Trianon: Hungary's Neighborhood Policy in the Years of Regime Change], 2nd enlarged ed. Budapest: Osiris, 2023.

Keskeny, Ernő. *A magyar–oroszl kapcsolatok 1989–2002* [Hungarian-Russian Relations 1989–2002]. Budapest: Századvég Kiadó, 2012.

Kraljo, Mihajlo. "Ukrajna elnöki megbízottjának rendelkezése az ukránnyelvtörvény és az Ukrajnában élő nemzeti kisebbségekről szóló törvény területi érvényesítéséről" [Order of the Presidential Envoy of Ukraine on the territorial enforcement of the Law on the Ukrainian Language and the Law on National Minorities in Ukraine], *Pro Minoritate* 3 (1993), Nos. 1–2, 43.

Kuzio, Taras. "The Rusyn Question in Ukraine: Sorting out Fact from Fiction," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 32 (2005) no. 1: 1–15.

Magocsi, Paul Robert. *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*, 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010.

Magocsi, Paul Robert. *With Their Backs to the Mountains: A History of Carpathian Rus' and Carpatho-Rusyns*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015.

Paládi, Renáta. "A magyar–ukrán kétoldalú kapcsolatépítés az 1991 májusában aláírt kétoldalú egyezmények tükrében" [The Building of Hungarian-Ukrainian Contacts in the Light of the Bilateral Agreements Signed in May, 1991], *ujkor.hu*, May 31, 2021, [https://ujkor.hu/content/magyar-ukran-ketoldalukapcsolatepites-az-1991-majusaban-alairt-kegyezmenyek-tukreben](https://ujkor.hu/content/magyar-ukran-ketoldalukapcsolatepites-az-1991-majusaban-alairt-ketoldalukapcsolatepites-az-1991-majusaban-alairt-kegyezmenyek-tukreben).

Páldi, András. *Egyre távolabb Moszkvától* [Further and Further away from Moscow]. Budapest: Belváros Könyvkiadó, 1996.

Póti, László. *Ukrajna kül- és biztonságpolitikája, 1990–2000* [Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy, 1990–2000]. Budapest: Strategic Defence Research Office, 2001.