Peterecz, Zoltán. "The Aftermath of Johnson–Reed: John F. Montgomery and Jewish Immigration from Hungary in the 1930s." *Hungarian Cultural Studies*. Journal of the American Hungarian Educators Association, Volume 18 (2025): http://ahea.pitt.edu DOI: 10.5195/ahea.2025.595

The Aftermath of Johnson–Reed: John F. Montgomery and Jewish Immigration from Hungary in the 1930s

Zoltán Peterecz

Abstract: The Johnson-Reed Law was a milestone in the history of immigration to the United States, and has been analyzed from various angles, especially how the legal measure dramatically decreased the inflow of immigrants from these places. The article investigates how one American minister in Hungary, John F. Montgomery (1933–1941), reacted and dealt with the new measure. From the mid-1930s in particular, the number of Hungarian Jewish people who wanted to immigrate to the United States grew, which caused frustration to the then American minister in Budapest. Therefore, a closer examination will be made of Montgomery's work and attitude regarding would-be Jewish immigrants. This case study will broaden our understanding of the aftermath of the Johnson-Reed Law of 1924.

***Keywords**: Hungarian immigrants, interwar years, John F. Montgomery, anti-Semitism*

Biography: Zoltán Peterecz earned his Ph.D. in 2010. He teaches as an associate professor at the Institute of English, American, and German Studies at Eszterházy Károly Catholic University, Eger, Hungary. His main field of research is American history, American foreign affairs, and American-Hungarian relations in the first half of the twentieth century, on which subjects he regularly publishes books and articles. He is also the editor-in-chief of *Pro&Contra*, an online English-language journal for PhD students and young academics. *zpeterecz@yahoo.com*

Introduction

Today, there is an ongoing migration crisis at the southern border of the United States. The politically-heated debate over immigration, however, is not new. Over the course of history, the North American country, the "nation of immigrants," offered an opportunity for many Europeans, Asians, Latin Americans, and Africans to immigrate in hopes of a better and more secure life. From the very beginning, however, the topic of migration, citizenship, and possible limitations and restriction have been under the purview of politics with the Naturalization Act of 1790 being one of the first laws passed by the 1st US Congress under the new Constitution. This law provided that only "free white persons of good character" could become citizens of the young country, that is, it already excluded a range of people along racial and economic lines: indentured servants, Native Americans, free blacks, and later Asians were denied a path toward citizenship not to speak of millions of slaves. While welcoming numerous immigrants in

ISSN 1936-6879 (online)

different waves, this exclusionary lawmaking practice also remained a driving force for a long time, and with the Johnson–Reed Act of 1924 it reached its zenith, introducing strict quotas on immigrants. In the case of Hungary, this meant that after 1924 only 473 Hungarian citizens could legally immigrate to the United States annually, a number that ten years earlier had been almost 150,000 and was close to 200,000 in the peak year of 1907 (Puskás From Hungary 21–26 and Ties 18–24).

As a result, starting with 1924, the various American embassies, legations, and consulates had to bear the administrative brunt of the Quota Act. This paper looks at how this work was carried out and what challenges it caused in the work of American officers in Hungary, especially investigating the activities of the American ministers in the interwar years. The main focus is on John F. Montgomery, who served the longest in Budapest and under whose watch the immigration question became the most acute in light of the changing political landscape in Europe in general, and Hungary in particular, prior to and after the outbreak of the Second World War and in relation to Jewish immigration.

Hungarian Immigration to the United States—A Brief Historical Overview

Hungarian immigration to the United States started early but was sporadic, disorganized, and remained a low-key phenomenon until the 1880s. From the end of the 19th century, however, thanks to relatively cheap ocean fares and limited opportunities in the Monarchy, more and more ethnic Hungarians, mainly from the peasantry, immigrated to the United States. The motivation was first and foremost to make money and then return to Hungary, buy some land, and live under better circumstances. This is the reason why—although Hungarian immigrants established churches, newspapers, and various federations—repatriation among Hungarians—similarly to other nations from the larger region—was high. Before the First World War, this repatriation rate was about 30% among them (for details on this period see Puskás From Hungary 26–28 and Ties 22–24, 38–48). Despite this movement, which came to a halt with the First World War, as Tibor Glant notes, notwithstanding occasional critical voices, "in the Hungarian image of America the dominant element remained the myth of the political and economic 'promised land'" (138).

Prior to 1918, Hungary consisted of many ethnicities besides Hungarians—Slovaks, Romanians, Serbs, Croats—, therefore data is hard to produce as to how many ethnic Hungarians immigrated to the New World through Ellis Island after 1892. The available estimates place the number of immigrants from Hungary between one and one and a half million people who, however, showed strong regional differences as to where they came from within the country (Puskás From Hungary 56–63, Ties 3–35;Tezla). Together with this large number of people and how they did or rather did not assimilate into the mainstream American society, the image of Hungary started to change. The former picture of a freedom-loving and self-sacrificing nation became one of the semi-Asiatic and semi-European poor Hunky who was willing to do hard work but was incapable of transforming themselves into a true American (Frank 2018, 264–275; Glant 1998: 37–40).

This wave of "new" immigration—from Hungary and other Southern and Eastern European countries in general—created a backlash among many Americans. Most of those arriving were poor and uneducated, mostly Catholic or Jewish, who did not speak English, and found it difficult to assimilate. This immense mass migration (of a non-WASP majority) was a new phenomenon and created anxiety among many. Fueled by nativist sentiment and xenophobic views, many people demanded that immigration from these European countries be curbed

because immigrants represented a threat to the fabric of American society. Although this large-scale immigration fell back after the outbreak of the First World War, the voices that demanded a drastic cut in the number of people allowed in the country did not abate. As a result of this popular outcry, first the Literacy Act of 1917 was approved, then the two Quota Acts were passed in 1921 and 1924, respectively, the second of which was the Johnson–Reed Act with its drastic overhaul of the admissible numbers from Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe. This act also completely excluded possible immigrants from Asia. In the wake of the Johnson–Reed Act, the annual quota for Hungarian immigration was set at 473, hardly enough to meet the demand in the country (see the Introduction to this cluster for more details).

The quotas ended mass immigration but they had other consequences as well. It must be noted, for example, that quite a few people immigrated from the above-mentioned region to the United States illegally, circumventing the drastic restrictions set up by the American authorities. Most commonly, these people traveled to Canada first (besides Mexico and Cuba), and from there found their way to the United States, typically along the Great Lakes, where just behind the border many job opportunities awaited them (at least they hoped). Due to its very nature, it would be impossible to specify exactly how many people, and among them how many Hungarians, arrived via this route to the United States, but, in the 1920s it represented an alternative for Europeans wanting to make it to the United States (see Bavery 2020; Venkovits 2020: 99–121; Venkovits 2024).

At the same time with the quotas, the relations between the two countries also changed. As a consequence of the First World War, Hungary became a fully independent and sovereign country by the end of 1918 and (as the United States Senate refused to ratify the Paris Peace Treaty, and as a result America did not become part of the League of Nations) it signed a separate peace treaty with the United States in August 1921, and established diplomatic relations for the first time. For the next twenty years, the successive American ministers—in addition to such perennial problems as the question of the king, the redrawing of the borders, or the work of the various prime ministers—had to deal with the always sensitive question of Hungarian immigration to the United States. Since the limitation per the Quota Acts were strict, and political circumstances in Europe turned much worse in the 1930s, there was soon such a backlog that made legal immigration of Hungarians more of a dream than a possibility.

The Johnson–Reed Act was not the only piece of legislation that made the ministers involved in immigration to the United States. On the heel of this restrictive immigration act, another bill became law. The Rogers Act of 1924 was the result of an ongoing effort that tried to reform the diplomatic service of the United States. Among other things, this act unified the diplomatic and consular services (Heinrichs 95 – 106, 115 – 117; Schulzinger 65–75; Werking 248–249; Gelfand 49–63). This inevitably meant that the ministers were more involved in handling immigration, which held true in the case of the ministers accredited to Hungary in the interwar years as well. Although the issue of ever-increasing number of people eager to immigrate to the United States came to the forefront in earnest only by the second half of the 1930s in the wake of Hitler's coming to power and the pernicious repercussions that followed—mainly regarding the Jewish population—, the tension that the Johnson–Reed Act caused was palpable from the very beginning.

The Quota Act and the Daily Work of the U.S. Ministers in Budapest

As was mentioned, before the First World War, more than a million people had immigrated to the United States from Hungary. With the new regulations this number was legally limited to less than half a thousand a year. Theodore Brentano, the first U.S. minister to Hungary, even before the passage of the bill, informed the State Department that no one in Washington seemed to be taking into consideration what harmful effect the passing of such a bill might have on the previously dynamic Hungarian immigration pattern.[1] Despite the League of Nations-orchestrated financial reconstruction starting in 1924 and producing spectacular results in the realms of state finances in two years' time, the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian population remained poor. Since this circumstance always played the number one push factor in one's decision to go to America and make ends meet there, the number of those who wished to immigrate to the United States did not considerably change after the passage of the act. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that many Hungarians now lived outside Hungary's new borders in other successor countries like Romania or Czechoslovakia. In their peculiar situation they were encouraged to immigrate to the United States, but many of them came to Hungary putting further strain on the nation. Therefore, earlier existing push factors of economic problems, unemployment, etc. remained tangible after 1924 as well. Also, many found the current Hungarian political climate too rigid. Indeed, during the Horthy era (1920–1944), named after Miklós Horthy as the ultimate political leader of the country, political freedoms were curtailed to a significant degree, especially for those on the left and the Jews. No wonder that politically motivated immigration existed in these years also. However, the newly introduced quotas simply made it impossible for a larger Hungarian contingency to immigrate to the United States.

The American ministers serving in Budapest in the interwar years noted this phenomenon, but from a strict point of view of work they did not need to react. Their work was mainly taken up by reporting various events regarding domestic issues and foreign political tensions, but immigration for a period did not create a source of concern for them. However, from time to time the issues pertaining to immigration reached the threshold of reportable curiosity, and toward the end of the 1930s sometimes even trouble. For example, in 1924, and in all likelihood before and after as well, forging immigration documents was a commonplace activity in Hungary. Also, simply fraudulent promises to those who wanted to immigrate to the United States thrived: swindlers cheated money out of desperate people by assuring them that they would be able to obtain visas or passports to proceed to the overseas promised land.[2] However, the question of quotas did not enter the ministerial reports in the 1920s.

Due to the effects of the 1929 financial crash and the Great Depression in its wake, immigration as a global phenomenon became less of a problem. There was simply no work available in the United States to immigrant laborers. At this time, the Central, Eastern, and Southern European quotas were not yet filled for years ahead, the dynamic became less accentuated, since the prospects of job opportunities awaiting the would-be immigrants were essentially nonexistent. Problems began with the rise of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi ideology that wanted to treat Jews not only as second-ranked citizens, but saw them as the enemy within, who

[1] Theodore Brentano to Charles Evans Hughes, March 4, 1924, 864.00/573, M 708, Roll 6, NARA.
[2] Theodore Brentano to Charles Evans Hughes, July 7, 1924, 864.00/584, M 708, Roll 6, NARA.

had to be eliminated one way or another. In the beginning Hitler and his anti-Semitic propaganda were not taken really seriously in political circles, which was helped by the sometimes thinly-veiled anti-Semitism in most European countries as well as in the United States. The Jewish people, however, first in Germany but with the passing of time also in other countries, such as Austria or Hungary, started to panic and many thought the solution to their threatened existence might lay in immigrating either to Great Britain or, preferably, to the United States.

In Hungary during the term of prime minister Gyula Gömbös (1932–36), a clear shift to the right took place in politics parallel to the growing political friendship and reliance on Germany as an economic partner. Coincidentally, after the spring of 1933, that is, right after Hitler's becoming the chancellor of Germany, and a few months after Gömbös took the premiership of Hungary, John Flourney Montgomery arrived in Hungary as the new American minister. Montgomery was not a career diplomat but a political appointee—this was the typical status for almost all of the American ministers serving in Hungary in the interwar period. In fact, he received the position of minister as a reward for his longtime and faithful support for the Democratic Party. He had no prior knowledge about Hungary or the adjacent region, but was eager to learn and do his job the best he could (Frank 2003; Montgomery 1947).

One of Montgomery's challenges over time became Hungarian immigration, mainly the issue of Hungarian Jews. The phenomenon was not new, however, since Jewish immigration from Hungary had already started in the 1920s. After Hungary introduced the infamous *numerus clausus* law in 1920, which restricted the number of Jewish students in Hungarian higher education, many Jewish Hungarians, most of them scientists, led by instinct, worsening conditions starting right after the First World War, and later by legal enforcement, found a route to better conditions and freedom outside Hungary—both in the political and scientific sense. This route led from Budapest to the post-World War I Weimar Republic as the typical initial step, first of all to Berlin. This was both due to the academic freedom there in the 1920s and the restricted American quotas beginning in 1921. From the 1930s, with the ever stricter laws passed against the Jews in Germany, this group tried to find their way to the big cities of the United States, often via England. Leo Szilárd, John von Neumann, Theodore von Kármán, and Michael Polanyi were all such luminaries of Hungarian science that traveled this road (Frank 2009; Marx 1994; Marton 2007).

As the 1930s progressed, there was a steady uptick in the Hungarian Jewish community wishing to leave the country for fear of further repression of their rights, especially after Hitler's rise and because of Gömbös's close relationship with Germany. The first signs from Budapest that the workload regarding immigration started to overwhelm the staff at the legation started to appear in 1937. In mid-June Howard K. Travers, first secretary of the legation, sent a letter to Montgomery, who at that time spent his regular summer vacation in Vermont. Travers informed his boss that the legation had "had an awful rush of immigration and American passport work and are very badly off for a Hungarian speaking clerk."[3] He had also asked for Washington's help to no avail. The staffing problem meant that there were no adequate personnel to do the

[3] Howard K. Travers to John F. Montgomery, June 18, 1937, Box 2, Folder 7: Travers, Howard, Volume IV - Foreign Service personnel exchanges, *Montgomery Papers*, Yale University.

screening and related administrative work stemming from the high number of Hungarian visa applicants, most of whom were Jewish.

Up until late 1938, that is, before the First Vienna Award, there were roughly half a million Jews living in Hungary.[4] With a considerable part of the former territories that Hungary lost in the Treaty of Trianon (1920) being regained between 1938 and 1941 (thanks to the occupation of Sub-Carpathia together with the First and Second Vienna Awards), this number climbed up to about 800,000 in 1941. This large minority faced all kinds of obstacles to their peaceful existence. The Hungarian state introduced various laws restricting the legal standing and economic opportunities of their Jewish citizens. The First "Jew Law" (1938) was a restrictive measure mainly concerning occupation; a year later the Second "Jew Law" (1939) was a racially exclusive measure that further curbed the rights of the Hungarian Jewry; while the Third "Jew Law" (1941) represented further restriction in defining who was considered a Jew and this bill forbade mixed marriages and sexual relationships between Jews and non-Jews. This last law was promulgated months after Montgomery had left Hungary. By that time, however, legal immigration from Hungary to the United States—as a realistic escape from the detrimental situation—was an ever-narrowing possibility. By the end of 1941 Hungary declared war on the United States and all possible avenues were closed to immigration.

Montgomery was not necessarily grumbling because of the increased amount of work that the growing number of applicants presented; however, his own anti-Semitism surfaced at the same time—with elemental force. During the discussed period, that is, the interwar years, it was not only Central Europe where anti-Jewish sentiment was prominent. This worldview was a widespread phenomenon that was tangible in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well, especially overseas. In the United States, because of the large number of Jewish immigrants, their relatively low assimilation rate, and their also relatively successful financial position, many looked askance at them collectively (Dinnerstein 1994; Ribuffo 1980; Pollak 1983; Buchsbaum 1987). The repressive Nazi regime in the 1930s was not able to alter this sentiment. A good indication for this was that just two weeks after the infamous *Kristallnacht* in November 1938—a nationwide brutal crackdown on Jews in Germany—Gallup asked Americans on the issue. Although the overwhelming majority (94%) disapproved of how the Jews were treated under Hitler, when asked whether a larger number of Jewish exiles should be allowed to enter the United States, the decisive majority (72%) responded "No" (Greene and Newport 2018). Montgomery was no outlier to this trend—which was equally true to his predecessor, Nicholas Roosevelt (Peterecz 2025).

Therefore, Montgomery was inclined to blame the Jews for their almost panicky reaction to the worsening Hungarian situation, which often took shape in trying to secure a visa to the United States. It is obvious that he was not on the same page with these people, but probably subconsciously he saw the situation not as one calling for any desperate measures. As he complained to one of his former staff members in the spring of 1938, the legation in Budapest was experiencing "an awful rush of applicant for visas."[5] Then his acerbic nature dominated the

[4] By the decision of Germany and Italy, Hungary regained some of the lost territories in the north in November 1938. Hungary received about 4,600 square miles with about almost a million ethnic Hungarians. For a comprehensive study on the First Vienna Award see, Gergely 2002.

[5] John F. Montgomery to James B. Stewart (Mexico), April 12, 1938, *Montgomery Papers*, Yale University.

rest of his thinking: "I think we are now having about a four-year quota booked, and the percentage of God's chosen people is higher than ever."[6] He was of the opinion that Congress should suspend immigration to the United States altogether, partly because so many Jews wanted to get in. His vitriolic words well expressed his attitude: "It seems there are lots of political refugees who want to go the Jewnited States of America, and our friends in Congress are very much excited about it."[7] As he wrote to his old friend, George Creel, "Not only every Jew in California but every Jew in America has some relative that he wants to bring to America and they all seem to have an enormous number of relatives. Further, when they have taken care of the relatives they begin to bring in their friends."[8] Montgomery here referred to some features of the existing immigration requirements. After registration at the respective consulates in Europe, the prospective immigrants needed to gather all kinds of paperwork in order to obtain a visa: identity papers, police certificates, exit and transit permissions, a valid ship ticket, and a financial affidavit. This last piece was important because people had to avoid the categorization that they might become a public charge in which case entry to the United States was to be denied. To go around this hurdle, one needed a sponsor in America who would guarantee that the person in question would not represent a financial burden for the state. In most cases this sponsor was a family member already living in the US.[9] It is worth quoting Montgomery's letter at length on how he and another American official attacked this mass movement of Jews to the United States as it well reflects his real sentiments:

> If you could see the class of people coming to the United States you would be very disconsolate. The Consul from Vienna was here lately and we had a very violent argument because he claimed that the people they were sending to America were worse than or worseness (if there is such a word) of our emigrants, but I couldn't convince him. […] He said he signed over 5,000 visas for America for people whom he felt were a positive menace to the country, and it made him sick to think about it. If there was only some selection it wouldn't be so bad as there are high-type Jews in all these countries, but, unfortunately, the quota is filled up with the least desirable type, and when you say that you have said something.[10]

It is important to note that Montgomery's attitude was not an exception; his worldview pertaining to the Jews was shared by many officials in the U.S. State Department, including Breckinridge Long, for instance, who for the better part of the Second World War served as Assistant Secretary of State and was responsible for trying to stop immigration, which meant keeping refugee Jews out of the United States. But the general American public also viewed

[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] John F. Montgomery to George Creel, January 18, 1939, Folder: Creel, George, Strictly Personal Correspondence, 1933–1937, Montgomery Papers, OSzK.
[9] For the various categories of quota and non-quota immigrants and fulfilling the requirement thereof, see, *The Statutes at Large of the United States of America*, 68th Cong., Sess. I, Vol. 43, Part 1, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1925, pp. 153–169.
[10] Ibid.

increased immigration of Jews unfavorably. As was mentioned, this attitude met the ruling American public opinion.

The Hungarian political milieu provided an atmosphere in which it was easier to come to such conclusions, although the visceral anti-Semitism of Montgomery had been shaped in the United States. In Hungary, especially after the short-lived Soviet Republic in 1919, there was a widespread and open anti-Semitic rhetoric in public discourse. Pál Teleki, the prime minister between February 1939 and April 1941, who committed suicide shortly after Montgomery's departure, was in many ways the embodiment of this. During his first premiership in 1920, he was responsible for the aforementioned infamous *numerus clausus*, which limited the number of Jews who were allowed to study in higher education, and throughout the interwar period there were also many atrocities committed against Jews. In 1939 Teleki played a role in passing the Second "Jew Law", and he was the main architect behind the third such bill passed in 1941—both of these drastically curbed the rights of the Hungarian Jewry (Ablonczy 2024: 196–201, 241–243).

From 1938 it became a regular feature of Montgomery's reports to the State Department and in his correspondence to people in and out of government that with underfunding the various legations, and especially the one in Budapest, they could not cope with the massive burden of immigration. He complained to his Austrian counterpart, George S. Messersmith, that the overwork was immense, "the whole place looks and smells like Ellis Island," and things were not looking good because "the number of applications is increasing rather than decreasing, even though we are now ten years ahead of the quota."[11] A few months later, as the situation showed no signs of abatement, he used desperate language. He shared his frustration again with Messersmith, since if someone, the American minister in Vienna had to appreciate the predicament he was in. "The visa proposition is practically threatening the existence of the Legation," he wrote. "We cannot keep up taking care of a year's quota every day and run the Legation in our present quarters. It is absolutely impossible."[12] He thought this was having an effect on the political work, and grumbled his annoyance at the stinginess of Washington. His main concern was "to try to preserve the existence of the Legation and prevent it from being entirely subordinated to the visa work. At present it is about 25:75, the Legation being on the losing end."[13] He believed that the conflating of the legation and the consulate backfired, however a good idea it may have seemed at the beginning of the 1920s. By the eve of the Second World War the balance had long disappeared and such a system was detrimental to the political work that he valued on a higher plane than the input of the visa section. According to Montgomery, in early 1939, there were 25,622 registrants for Hungarian non-preference quota aside from the more than ten thousand registrants for other country quotas.[14] After the war broke out in September 1939, he complained to his predecessor that although Budapest was a very

[11] John F. Montgomery to George S. Messersmith, May 5, 1938, Folder: Messersmith, George S., *Montgomery Papers*, Yale University.
[12] John F. Montgomery to George S. Messersmith, January 12, 1939, Folder: Messersmith, George S., *Montgomery Papers*, Yale University.
[13] Ibid.
[14] John F. Montgomery to George S. Messersmith, March 2, 1939, Folder: Messersmith, George S., *Montgomery Papers*, Yale University.

quiet place, as "for a permanent visa, there are now 33,700 applications which exhaust the visa quota for seventy years."[15] As he wrote to his friend, Creel, it was almost impossible to cheat with quotas and give preference to any given case despite the fact that people tried to bribe legation and consulate officers all the time.[16]

When John F. Montgomery left Hungary on March 17, 1941, many Hungarian notables and all the foreign ministers bid him farewell—with the conspicuous exception of the German, Italian, Japan, and Soviet diplomatic representatives. Horthy had a large bouquet of flowers sent to Montgomery's wife, and additional farewell gifts were given by the gathered throng of Hungarians (Montgomery 1947: 155). The American minister could freely leave the country that had been skating on thin ice in the preceding eighteen months. However, there were left behind almost 600,000 Jews, who—without the possibility to escape to America—were subject to terrible treatment in the days ahead.

4. Conclusion

The case of the Hungarian experience with legally restricted immigration to the United States is an interesting case study of the interwar years. First and foremost, it highlights how domestic policy—in this case anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic sentiment—can affect other countries' internal matters: how it can exacerbate them, and, in the end, how it can worsen an already bad situation. In other words, domestic and foreign policy are so closely intertwined that Congress, regardless of the time period, ought to take events outside the country into consideration when passing bills. In this context, restricting immigration for domestic political reasons might backfire when foreign affairs create a situation the solution of which is in tension with the popular homeland ruling. Of course, representatives are mainly responsible for their constituencies, and immigration, and the first two decades of the twentieth century—similarly to what one experiences today—created such tensions in America that Congress felt it needed to respond. Second, Congress can pass a bill but needs to make sure that various officers down the chain who will be responsible for carrying out the law are provided with adequate means. Third, the personalities of those that will be in charge of enforcing those laws are an important factor. John F. Montgomery was a good example of an American minister who carried with him such prejudices that tainted his views and attitudes. That is not to say he did not do his work or deliberately put Jews in Hungary in an even tighter squeeze. But in the wake of the Johnson–Reed Act of 1924, all the aforementioned elements created a perfect storm: tens of thousands of Jewish people were denied possible access to the United States due to shortsighted domestic political views, which partly cost the hardships and lives of so many. In the twenty-first century, when the U.S. society and Congress are facing a similarly difficult period on account of mass migration—this time mainly at the southern border—perhaps the lessons from a century earlier might provide guidelines.

[15] John F. Montgomery to Nicholas Roosevelt, October 21, 1939, Box 6, Folder 4: Roosevelt, Nicholas, Volume X - Personal correspondence, *Montgomery Papers*, Yale University.

[16] John F. Montgomery to George Creel, December 8, 1938, Folder: Creel, George, Strictly Personal Correspondence, 1933–1937, Montgomery Papers, OSzK.

Works Cited

Archival sources

M 708, Roll 6, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D. C., USA.

Montgomery Papers, Manuscript and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, USA.*Montgomery Papers*, Országos Széchenyi Könyvtár (National Széchenyi Library), Budapest, Hungary.

Secondary sources

Ablonczy, Balázs. *Pál Teleki (1874–1941): The Life of a Controversial Hungarian Politician*. Reno, Nevada: Helena History Press, 2024, pp. 196–201, 241–243.

Bavery, Ashley Johnson. *Bootlegged Aliens: Unauthorized Immigration on America's Northern Border*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020.

Buchsbaum, Tamar. "A Note on Antisemitism in Admissions at Dartmouth." *Jewish Social Studies* 49 (Winter, 1987): 79–84.

Dinnerstein, Leonard. *Anti-Semitism in America*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Frank, Tibor. Edited and introduced by. *Discussing Hitler. Advisers of U.S. Diplomacy in Central Europe 1934–1941*. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2003.

Frank, Tibor. *Double Exile. Migrations of Jewish-Hungarian Professionals through Germany to the United States, 1919–1945*. London: Peter Lang, 2009.

Frank, Tibor, "Ellenség vagy barát? Az amerikai Magyarország-kép színeváltozásai," [Foe or Friend? The Changes in the American Image of Hungary]. in Tibor Frank. *Amerika világai* (The Worlds of America). Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 2018, pp. 264–275.

Gelfand, Lawrence E. "Towards a Merit System for the American Diplomatic Service 1900–1930." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 1988/4, pp. 49–63.

Glant, Tibor. *Amerika, a csodák és csalódások földje. Az Amerikai Egyesült Államok képe a hosszú XIX. század magyar utazás irodalmában* [America, the Land of Wonders and Disappointments. The Image of the United States in the Long 19th Century in Hungarian Travel Writing]. Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetemi Kiadó, 2013.

Glant, Tibor. *Through the Prism of the Habsburg Monarchy: Hungary in American Diplomacy and Public Opinion during World War I*. Boulder, Co.: Social Science Monographs, 1998, pp. 37–40.

Greene, Daniel and Frank Newport. "American Public Opinion and the Holocaust." April 23, 2018, https://news.gallup.com/opinion/polling-matters/232949/american-public-opinion-holocaust.aspx, accessed January 24, 2025.

Heinrichs, Waldo H. *American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 95–106, 115–117.

Marton, Kati. *The Great Escape: Nine Jews Who Fled Hitler and Changed the World*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007.

Marx, György. *The Voice of the Martians*. Budapest: Loránd Eötvös Phyisical Society, 1994.

Montgomery, John Flournoy. *Hungary, The Unwilling Satellite*. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947.

Peterecz, Zoltán. *A Roosevelt in the World of Diplomacy and Journalism. Nicholas Roosevelt and American Domestic and Foreign Policy in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*. Reno, Nevada: Helena History Press, 2025.

Pollak, Oliver B. “Antisemitism, the Harvard Plan, and the Roots of Reverse Discrimination.” *Jewish Social Studies* 45 (Spring, 1983): 113–22.

Puskás, Julianna. *Kivándorló Magyarok az Egyesült Államokban, 1880-1940*. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982.

Puskás, Julianna. *From Hungary to the United States (1880 -1940)* Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982.

Puskás, Julianna. *Ties That Bind, Ties That Divide: 100 Years of Hungarian Experience in the United States*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 2000.

Ribuffo, Leo P. “Henry Ford and ‘The International Jew,’” *American Jewish History* 69 (June 1980): 437–77.

Sallai, Gergely. *Az első bécsi döntés* [The First Vienna Award]. Budapest: Osiris, 2002.

Schulzinger, Robert D. *The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook and Style of United States Foreign Service Officers, 1908–1931*. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1975.

Tezla, Albert. ed. *“Egy szívvel két hazában”. Az amerikás magyarok 1895–1920* [“In Two Countries with One Heart.” Hungarians in America, 1895–1920]. Budapest: Corvina, 2005.

The Statutes at Large of the United States of America. 68th Cong., Sess. I, Vol. 43, Part 1, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1925.

Venkovits, Balázs. “’The New Mecca of Immigrants’: Hungarian Emigration to Canada and the Role of Immigration Propaganda.” in *Minorities in Canada. Intercultural Investigations*. Vassányi Miklós et al. eds., Budapest and Paris: Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary L’Harmattan Publishing, 2020, pp. 99–121.

Venkovits Balázs. “From Non-Preferred to Unlawful: Illegal Hungarian Immigration on the US-Canada Border in the 1920s.” in *Stalwart Peasants, Undesirables, Refugees: Central and Eastern European Immigration to Canada*. Venkovits Balázs ed., Warsaw and Berlin: Sciendo, 2024, pp. 73–91. https://doi.org/10.2478/9788367405454-005.

Werking, Richard Hume. *The Master Architects Building the United States Foreign Service, 1890–1931*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1977.